



JSC Building 32 Facility Fault Tolerance

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
Agenda



- Purpose
- Background
- Methodology
- Findings/Lessons Learned
- Actions Taken
- Summary
- Questions

Purpose

- **Conduct a thorough analysis of the JSC Building 32 facility systems and utilities used to support test article integration activities in the facility and thermal-vacuum testing in Chamber A.**
 - Provide known risks and recommendations
 - Provide counsel on facility risk reduction priorities





Background



- Why did we conduct this review?

Primary: Identify risk to the James Webb Space Telescope program and provide recommendations on risk-reduction measures

Secondary: Validate and update the facility Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) in an effort to understand the facility's fault tolerance



Methodology



- **Step 1:** Identify all major facility systems & utilities
 - Helium refrigeration plant(s)
 - Liquid Nitrogen storage and distribution system
 - Rough vacuum system
 - High vacuum system(s)
 - Chamber airflow management system
 - Facility heating, ventilation, & air conditioning (HVAC)
 - Normal & emergency power
 - Data acquisition, recording, & controls system
 - Facility steam system
 - Facility chilled water system
 - Cooling tower
 - Closed loop cooling water
 - Etc...



Methodology



- **Step 3:** Identify system and utility dependencies and populate into the matrix.
 - Dependencies should be identified and evaluated for individual system components and/or subsystems to the extent possible
 - Start off by simply marking with an “X” if there is a dependency

[illegible]



Methodology



- **Step 4:** Evaluate systems for component/subsystem loss to determine those that result in system shut down/failure.
 - This is in line with your Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 - This needs to be evaluated for each phase of your test/operation (as applicable). For example:
 - Chamber @ rough vacuum, ambient temp
 - Chamber @ high vacuum, ambient temp
 - Chamber @ 80K (LN2 shrouds full cold)
 - Chamber < 80K, but > 32K (helium shrouds cooling)
 - Chamber < 32K (helium shrouds full cold)




Methodology: Helium Systems



Nominal Operations



JSC SITE UTILITIES



BLDG 32 UTILITIES





Methodology: Helium Systems

Off-Nominal Operations




Off-Nominal Ops	Criticality	Failure Mode	Cause	Effects
Mode #1	2/3	Helium Train 1	Subsystem Single Point Failure: CMP1, CBX1 Loss of Utility	Loss of Refrigeration to Helium CryoPumping Panels (CPP)
Mode #2	2R	Compressor 3	Single Point failure Loss of Utility	Loss of Refrigeration to main Helium shroud/TA Zones
Mode #3	2R	Coldbox 3	Single Point failure	Loss of Refrigeration to main Helium shroud/TA Zones
Mode #4	2	Helium Zones	Zone Leakage, Zone Control Valve Failure	Loss of thermal control of Helium Zone
Mode #5	2R	DARAC	Single Point failure	Loss of sub-system data monitoring and HMI control screens
Shutdown	2	Helium Plant	Loss of Utility	Loss of Refrigeration to Helium CPP, main Helium shroud/TA Zones



Methodology: Helium Systems

Off-Nominal #1: Loss CW, CLCW, on Train 1





Methodology: Helium Systems



- Effect: Loss of Refrigeration to the Helium CryoPumping Panels
- Test Impacts: Criticality 2 / 3
 - Cooldown / Warm-Up: Released of Condensed Gas (“Burp”) from CPP
 - Steady State: Condensed Gas transfers to the main Helium Shrouds
- Controls:
 - System designed for 24-7 operations
 - TGL22 Turbine
 - MTBF: 190,500 hrs
 - MTTR: 3 hrs with spare
- Recommendation:
 - Re-commission Helium Train 2 (inactive) as back-up



Methodology



- **Step 5:** Define system categories & use your failure mode analysis in previous step to determine what utility or component losses result in you realizing one of these category levels
 - Examples:
 - Category 1 – Loss of system could result in personnel injury or loss of life
 - Category 2 – Loss of system could result in damage to test article or other critical facility hardware and ground support equipment
 - Category 3 – Loss of system could result in loss of test objective or schedule delay
 - Update matrix to show Category numbers in lieu of an “X” where applicable



Methodology



- **Step 6:** Eliminate or Mitigate your Risk
 - All Category 1 must be eliminated
 - All Category 2 should be eliminated or must be controlled/mitigated through redundancy
 - Category 3 can be eliminated/controlled if schedule & budget allow



Methodology



- **Step 7:** Evaluate for existing redundancy & update matrix
 - Does the redundant system have same capacity as the primary?
 - Does the redundant system fully meet requirements?
 - Is the redundant system fully operational?
 - Does the redundant system require reconfiguration to be employed?
 - Are procedures in place?
 - Are people trained?
 - How long does it take to reconfigure?




Methodology



- **Step 8:** Address remaining critical areas and develop controls and/or system redundancy in order to reduce risk to an acceptable level

So, after completing this process for JSC Building 32, this is what we found...

INTEGRATED MECHANICAL
SYSTEM



Actions Taken: Vacuum System

- Placed chamber rough vacuum system & cooling tower pumps/fans on emergency power
 - Replaced power distribution
 - Installed new transfer switches & breaker panels
 - Rental generator (2MW) & diesel tank provide 5 days run-time





Actions Taken: Helium Compressor 3



- Placing cooling tower pumps/fan on emergency power eliminates failure mode due to loss of cooling water to compressor 3
- Additionally, identified operational method providing redundancy on train 3 using the compressor from train 1
 - Requires temporary shutdown and minor reconfiguration of valves
 - Replicated failure during test and observed no thermal or contamination concerns for time required to reactivate system
 - Although Compressor 1 is smaller, it demonstrated sufficient capacity to cool and maintain temperatures on GHe shrouds



Actions Taken: Chamber Airflow Management System

- Installed fully-redundant backup system run off a 1MW generator
 - Ties into system at makeup air unit on roof





Summary



- Although a time-consuming process, we gained a much better understanding of our facility systems and their level of fault tolerance
- We have a clear understanding of our risk and are confident that a facility system/utility failure will not negatively impact sensitive/critical hardware in the chamber
- Strongly recommend others take the time to implement this or a similar process prior to the next test of critical hardware



Questions

